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LEGISLATION
NEW YORK's LAW OF ESTATES AND DISTRIBUTION: THE NEW
STATUS OF THE ADOPTED CHILD

Currently, the New York Law of Estates and Distribution
is undergoing a vigorous study.
Various problems are being
analyzed and legislation is being recommended to the Legislature
by the Commission on Estates.' On March 1, 1964, many changes
which resulted from these studies were officlally enacted into law.
Basically, most of the amendments were added to conform the
laws of estates to the complex changes of society and to eliminate
the diverse viewpoints reflected by court decisions. The purpose
of this note is to examine two selected amendments, Section
117 of the Domestic Relations Law and Section 49 of the
Decedent Estate Law, and compare the old law with the new law,

thus demonstrating the significance of the changes.

Section 117

establishes the right of an adopted child to succeed to the property
of his foster parents and their kin, while section 49 governs
the rights of adopted children as members of a class.
Adopted Children-Intestate Distribution

Beginning with March 1, 1964 the adopted child and the
foster parent:
shall sustain toward each other the legal relation of parerqt and child and
shall have all the rights and be subject to all the duties of that relation
including the rights of inheritance from and through each other and the
2
natural and adopted kindred of the foster parents or parent.

Section 117 further provides that the relationship between
a foster child and his natural parents is now terminated upon the
making of the order of adoption. 3 Previously, an adoption had
1 1963 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 19, SECOND REPORT OF THE TEMPORARY STATE
COMM'N ON THE MODERNIZATION, REVISION AND SIMPLIFICATION OF THE
LAW OF ESTATES [hereinafter cited as SECOND REP.].
2 N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 117. The italicized words indicate the additions
which became effective March 1, 1964.
3 Ibid. There is an exception in the case of a natural or foster parent
remarrying and subsequently consenting to the adoption by the stepmother
or stepfather. It is provided that the order of adoption shall not "affect
the rights of such consenting spouse and such foster child to inherit from
and through each other and their natural and adopted kindred."

1964 ]

LEGISLATION

no effect upon the inheritance rights of an adopted child; thus,
he could succeed to the property of his natural parents as if no
adoption had taken place. 4 Before analyzing the significance of
these changes, an examination of the history of New York's
adoption laws will be made in order to show the position of the
law prior to the recent amendment.
History
Adoption was unknown at common law and exists today only
by virtue of statute.5 In New York the earliest adoption statute
specifically withheld any rights of inheritance between an adopted
child and his foster parents, 6 but these rights were expressly
provided for fourteen years later.7 At that time it was also
provided that both the heirs and the next of kin of the adopted
child were to be treated as if the latter was the natural child of
the foster parents. 8 However, it is intt.esting to note that the
rights of inheritance only applied to adopted children taken from
private custody, and not to those taken from institutions. 9 The
New York statutes were subsequently amended, but these changes
did not substantially affect the inheritance rights of the adopted
child.' 0 Thus, the law continued to permit the adopted child to
inherit from both his natural parents and his foster parents.
However, the adopted child could not inherit from the collateral
parents'
relatives of the foster parents,"' but conversely, the foster
12
collateral kindred could inherit from the adopted child.
The problem of the adopted child and intestate distribution
may be divided into three areas. The first concerns the rights
of inheritance of the adopted child himself; the second, the
rights of those who inherit -from the adopted child; and the third,
the rights of the distributees of the foster child.

N.Y. Sess. Laws 1938, ch. 606, § 1.
Carroll v. Collins, 6 App. Div. 106, 109, 40 N.Y. Supp. 54, 56 (2d
Dep't 1896). See N.Y. Dom. Re.. LAw § 110 where adoption is defined as
4

5

"the legal proceeding whereby a person takes another person into the relation
of child and thereby acquires the rights and incurs the responsibilities of
parent in respect of such other person."
6 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1873, ch. 830, § 10.
7 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1887, ch. 703, § 10.

8 Ibid.
9 United States Trust Co. v. Hoyt, 150 App. Div. 621, 627, 135 N.Y.

Su~p. 849, 853-54 (1st Dep't 1912).
10 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1931, ch. 562; N.Y. Sess. Laws 1916, ch. 453; N.Y.
Sess. Laws 1915, ch. 352.
v. Hopkins, 202 App. Div. 606, 195 N.Y. Supp. 605 (4th
"Hopkins
236 N.Y. 545, 142 N.E. 277 (1922).
rine.,
Dep't), affd
12 Tn the Matter of Estate of Hollstein, 251 App. Div. 771, 295 N.Y.
Supp. 598 (3d Dep't 1937).
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In the first category, before amendment, it was provided
that the adopted child could inherit from and through his natural
parents as though no adoption had taken place.' 3 Thus, in the
case of In the Matter of Landers,1 4 the intestate was survived by
both a sister and a half-sister. Prior to the death of the intestate,
the half-sister 15 had been legally adopted by another family.
Nevertheless, the court relying on the statute held that the halfsister should share equally in the intestate distribution, since a
natural child's inheritance rights remain unaffected by adoption.
As a result of the 1964 revision, the half-sister apparently
would not inherit. The statute expressly provides that the foster
child's right of inheritance from and through his natural parents
shall terminate upon adoption.' 6 Although brothers and sisters
do not inherit in the above manner, but instead inherit in their
own right, the intent of the Legislature extends beyond the words
of the statute. It is provided
that the intent is to sever all ties
17
with the natural f4mily.

The adopted child also inherits from his foster parents and
their children.'18 However, before the revision he did not inherit
from the collateral relatives of the foster parents. Thus, in
Hopkins v. Hopkins,'9 the plaintiff was adopted, and eleven years
later her foster father died. Subsequently, the father's brother
died intestate, leaving a brother and a sister. In a suit- by the
adopted child to take by representation, the plaintiff was denied
recovery since the statute had no provision extending the adopted
child's right to inheritance from the next of kin of the foster
parent. The result would be different since amended section 117
now states specifically that the relationship between the foster
parent and2 0 the foster child includes the right to inherit through
each other.

In the second category the natural parents, their children
2
and their collateral kindred do not inherit from the adopted child. 1
22
In the case of In the Matter of Estate of Heye" a child was
's N.Y. Sess. Laws 1915, ch. 352, § 114.
14 100 Misc. 635, 166 N.Y. Supp. 1036 (Surr. Ct. 1917).
See In the
Matter of Adler, 202 Misc. 1100, 117 N.Y.S.2d 331 (Surr. Ct. 1952).
15 Half-blood inherits the same as full blood. See N.Y. DEcED. EsT. LAW
§ 83(12).
16 N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 117.
17 SECOND REP.
IS N.Y. Dolt. REL. LAW
9

§ 117.
1 Supra note 11. See In the Matter of Hall, 234 App. Div. 151, 254
N.Y. Supp. 564 (3d Dep't 1931), aff'd inem., 259 N.Y. 637, 182 N.E. 214
(1932).
2
0 N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 117.
21 Ibid.
22149 Misc. 890, 269 N.Y. Supp. 530 (Surr. Ct. 1933), aff'd

App. Div. 907, 271 N.Y. Supp. 1042 (4th Dep't 1934).

iner., 241
See In the Matter of
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left in the custody of her mother as the result of a prior divorce.
Subsequently she was adopted. The court, relying on the principle
that the effect of adoption is to exclude inheritance rights of all
natural kindred, held that the natural father was excluded from
any right to take part of the child's estate. The decision in this
case would still be followed because the amended Domestic
Relations Law continues to provide for the exclusion of the foster
child's natural parent. A corollary to this is the fact that
foster parents and their children, both natural and adopted, and
the collateral
kindred of the foster parents inherit from the adopted
23
child.
The third category consists of the distributees of the foster
child. The foster child's right of inheritance extended to his
distributees.2 4 Thus, in the case of In the Matter of Estate of
Whitcomb, 25 it was stated that the children of a deceased daughter
were entitled to their intestate share from their uncle, the natural
child of their mother's father. This situation remains unaffected
by the recent amendment.
A Comparison With Other Jurisdictions
In this area there is a divergence among the statutes of other
states. Many states allow the adopted child to share in the
distribution of both the real and personal property of his natural
parents,2 6 while others prohibit the adopted child from inheriting
anything from them.2 7 On the question' of intestate succession
by the adopted child from his foster parents and their kindred, the
states are generally in accord in allowing an adopted child to
inherit from his foster parents.2 8 As for his right to inherit
from the kindred of his foster parents, the general rule is that
the adopted child may not take unless the statute specifically

Estate of Meyer, 204 Misc. 265, 122 N.Y.S.2d 686 (Surr. Ct.), aff'd mine.,
2822 App. Div. 860, 124 N.Y.S.d 841 (1st Dep't 1953).
3 N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 117. For a case discussing the rights of collateral
24 kindred, see In the Matter of Estate of Hollstein, supra note 12.
N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 117.
25 170 Misc. 579, 10 N.Y.S.2d 824 (Surr. Ct. 1939).
26
E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 731.30 (1963); MF. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 158,
§ 40 (1954); TF-x. PRoB. CODE § 40 (1956). In the absence of statute,
adoption does not terminate the child's right to inherit from his natural
kindred. Wilson v. Wilson, 95 Colo. 159, 33 P.2d 969 (1934); Benner

v. Garrick, 109 Utah 172, 166 P.2d 257 (1946).

See L.Avy, LAW

OF

ADoprioN
ch. 10 (1954).
27
E.g., CAL. PROB. CODE §257; N.C. GEN. STAT. §29-17 (1949); VA.
CODE ANN. § 63-353 (1950).
28
E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 45-65 (1959); MASs. GEN. LAWS ANN.

ch. 210, §7 (1955); MIcH.

STAT. ANN.

§27.3178(549) (1959).
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provides otherwise.2 9
However, the statutes of certain states
provide that the adopted child may inherit from both the natural
and adopted children of the foster parents. 30
With respect to
the parents, natural and foster, the majority view is that the
foster take to the exclusion of the natural. 31 Other jurisdictions
permit natural parents or their kindred to inherit from the adopted
child only that property which came to the latter from the family
32
of the natural parents.
Significance of the Recent Amzendment
Embodied in our adoption statute is the fundamental social concept that
the relationship of parent and child, with all the personal and property rights
incident to it, may be established, independently of blood ties by operation
of law. . . .33
One of the goals of the recent amendment is to further
effectuate the principle expressed in the above quotation.
An
argument that has been made against permitting an adopted child
to inherit from the kindred of his foster parents is that the child
is being forced on the collateral relatives. However, this is fallacious
since the collateral kindred do not have control over their natural
heirs either, and consequently, the adopted child is not really
forced on the collateral relative to any greater degree than a
natural child. Since the consent of the natural relatives has nothing
to do with an heir at law, why should such consent be required
in adoption cases?
Prior to the amendment of Section 117 of the Domestic Relations Law, the adopted child possessed the right to inherit from
his natural parents. The main reason for eliminating this right
is that it may prove irjurious to the adopted child if his natural
29Brooks Banks & Trust Co. v. Rorabacher, 118 Conn. 202, 171 Atl. 655
(1934); Smyth v. McKissick, 222 N.C. 644, 24 S.E.2d 621 (1943). Several
examples of statutes allowing the adopted child to inherit from the kindred
of the foster parents are: CAL. PROB. CODE § 257; CONN. GEN. STAT. REv.
§45-65 (1939); ORE. REv. STAT. §111.210 (1963). Several examples of
statutes allowing the adopted child to inherit from his foster parents but
not their kindred are: ARK. STAT. ANN. §56-109(c) (1957); ME. REv.
STAT.
30 ANN. ch. 158, § 40 (1954); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-127 (1955).
E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §731.30 (1963); TENN. CODE ANN. §36-126
(1955)
31 ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 448 (1958).
E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 920 (1953); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§§16-1508-09 (1947); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §61-212 (1947); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 53-54 (1941); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.32.140 (Supp.
1963).
2 E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-109(b) (1957); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 210,
§7 33(1955); TENN. CODE ANN. §36-126 (1955).
1n the Matter of Will of Upjohn, 304 N.Y. 366, 373, 107 N.E.2d 492,
494 (1952).
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the identity of an unknown
family is revealed, since knowledge of
34
family could severely unsettle a child.
Also, the elimination of the adopted child's right to inherit
from two family trees is one of the final steps in bringing to
the adopted child the same status as that of the natural child.
Adopted Children as Members of a Class
Before the enactment of Section 49 of the Decedent Estate
Law, the use of words such as "child," "children" and "lawful
issue" in a will was subject to various interpretations. Generally,
the cases held that in determining whether the adopted child was
intended to be included under any of the above terms, it was
necessary to consider the facts and circumstances surrounding the
making of the will and the words of the will in its entirety.35 If
it then appeared that it was the testator's intent to include the
adopted child, the will would be construed as such.3"
Section 49 provides that a will "shall be construed to include
a reference to persons duly adopted by a person whose natural
child would be a member of that class unless the will or other
instrument specifically provides to the contrary." 3 7 The difficulty with the old approach was apparent. The testator's intent
was not susceptible to a simple determination, since there was no
definite rule or standard to apply to a specific case. The test was
rather a combination of several factors, and thus the cases resulted
in many different conclusions and interpretations.
Two basic factors which must be considered in analyzing the
cases in this area are: (1) the time of the adoption, whether it
occurred before or after the death of the person executing the
will, and (2) whether or not a gift over is involved.
Adoption Before-

No Gift Over

In this situation the courts generally favored the inclusion of
the adopted child. Thus, in the case of In the Matter of Estate
of Mawhinney,38 the question was whether an adopted son was a
child within the meaning of the provisions of Section 17 of the
Decedent Estate Law. This section limits bequests to charitable
and benevolent associations to not more than one-half of the
34 Note, Property Rights As Affected By Adoption, 25 BROOKLYN L. REv.
231, 241 n.46 (1959).
35 In the Matter of Will of Upjohn, supra note 33, at 375, 107 N.E.2d at
495-96.
36 Ibid.
37 N.Y. DEcw. EsT. LAW § 49.
38 146 Misc. 30, 261 N.Y. Supp. 334 (Surr. Ct. 1932), aff'd men., 239
App. Div. 874, 264 N.Y. Supp. 984 (3d Dep't 1933).
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estate of the testator when he leaves a child surviving.8 9 The son
was adopted before the death of the testator, and the court
held the former to be a child within the meaning of section 17.
In another case, 40 the Court of Appeals held Section 29 of the
Decedent Estate Law, which provides that property devised to
one who predeceased the testator "shall vest in the surviving
child or other descendant of the legatee or devisee, as if such
legatee or devisee had survived the testator and had died intestate,"
to apply to a child adopted before the death of the testatrix.
Finally, it was held that a legacy to a son of an adopted daughter,
taxable
the adoption occurring- Eefore the death of the testator, was
41
at the same rate as if the son was a natural grandchild.
Adoption After-

No Gift Over

No concrete rule could be formulated in this category. In
the case of In the Matter of Estate of Weller,42 the testator left
his estate to his children, and further provided that upon their
death, the estate was to pass to the latter's "legal representatives."
One daughter died leaving only an adopted son, whom she had
adopted subsequent to the testator's death. It was stated that
in the absence of contrary intent there was no reason to exclude
43
the adopted son from the class of "legal representatives."
44
In the case of In the Matter of Will of Guilmartin, the testatrix
made a will leaving part of the estate in trust for a friend. At
the time the will was executed, she did not have a daughter, but
subsequently, one was adopted. Section 26 of the Decedent Estate
Law provides that if a testator has a child born after the making
of the will, he sliall succeed to the parent's property as if the
parent died intestate. The court held this section applicable to
the adopted child, and therefore found the will a nullity. On
45
the other hand, in the case of In the Matter of Estate of Peabody,
the testatrix created two trusts, naming her son as the life bene39 N.Y. DEcD. EsT. LAW § 17 provides: "No person having a husband,
wife, child, or descendant or parent, shall . . . devise or bequeath to any
benevolent, charitable . . . association . . . more than one-half part of his
or her estate . .. .

40 In the Matter of Estate of Walter, 270 N.Y. 201, 200 N.E. 786
(1936).
41 In the Matter of Estate of Cook, 187 N.Y. 253, 79 N.E. 991 (1907).
In the area of constructive ownership of stock, the adopted child is treated
as the natural child. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 318.
427 Misc. 2d 366, 165 N.Y.S.2d 531 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
43 For a case employing similar reasoning, see In the Matter of Will of
Cohn, 184 Misc. 258, 55 N.Y.S.2d 797 (Surr. Ct. 1944), aff'd inem., 271
App. Div. 775, 66 N.Y.S.2d 408 (lst Dep't 1946), aff'd nein., 297 N.Y.
536, 74 N.E.2d 471 (1947).
44277 N.Y. 689, 14 N.E.2d 627 (1938).
45 17 Misc. 2d 656, 185 N.Y.S.2d 591 (Surr. Ct. 1959).
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ficiary. It was further provided that upon the son's death, the
corpus was to be paid to the living child or children of the son,
or per stirpes to any descendant of a deceased child. A child was
adopted subsequent to the death of the testatrix. The court held
that since the adoption took place eleven years after the testatrix's
death, her intent could not have been to include the adopted child.40
In a recent case, a child was adopted almost sixteen years after
the creation of a trust. It was reasoned that the trust agreement
providing for distribution per stirpes was limited to natural children,
in the absence of contrary language in the agreement itself or evidence of extraneous facts
showing that the settlor intended to
47
include adopted children.
When a Gift Over Is Involved
Before the revision, Section 117 of the Domestic Relations
Law provided:
As respects the passing and limitation over of real or personal property
dependent under the provisions of any instrument on the foster parent dying
without heirs, the foster child is not deemed48 the child of the foster parent
so as to defeat the rights of remaindermen.

The language of the statute appeared to prevent a foster
child from inheriting from his foster parent in the absence of
an affirmative contrary intent in decedent's will. In the case of
In the Matter of Will of Horn,49 it was stated that the statute
was aimed at the possibility of the severance of future estates by
adoption. The rationale of the court was that it would require
little effort for a person without any children to subsequently adopt
one and thus eliminate the remainderman. Consequently, the court
held this was the only situation when the adopted child was not
allowed to inherit. By implication, therefore, if a child is adopted
prior to the testator's death or if the adoption takes place after
the testator's death, but does not affect the rights of remaindermen,
the "limitation over" provision of section 117 will not apply.
Thus, the child would be included in the class of "lawful issue,"
"children" and language of similar import. However, this has not
been the standard consistently applied by the courts.
40

In the Matter of Estate of Smith, 14 Misc. 2d 205, 177 N.Y.S.2d 280
(Surr. Ct. 1958); In the Matter of Holt, 206 Misc. 789, 134 N.Y.S.2d 416

(Surr.
47 Ct. 1954).

1n the Matter of Estate of Dickson, 32 Misc. 2d 1000, 225 N.Y.S.2d
471 (Sup. Ct 1962); see In the Matter of Estate of Pryor, 38 Misc.

2d 722, 238 N.Y.S.2d 689 (Surr. Ct. 1963).
48N.Y. Doa. Rm. LAW

§ 117.

49256 N.Y. 294, 176 N.E. 399 (1931).
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1. Adoption Before
In the early case of New York Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Viele,50
a will provided for a trust with income to the decedent's daughter
for life and remainder to the daughter's "lawful issue" with a
provision for a "limitation over" if no issue survived. A child
was adopted before the death of the testator, but nevertheless, the
court held that the testator did not manifest an intent to include
the adopted child, and that when used, the words "lawful issue"
meant descendants when nothing contrary is indicated in the will.
On the other hand, in the more recent case of In the Matter of
Will of Upjohn,5 1 a will provided for the creation of trusts and the
payment of trust income to designated beneficiaries. Upon the
death of the beneficiaries, payments were then to be made to their
"lawful issue" or "descendants." A "limitation over" was further
provided, and a child was adopted ten years prior to the execution
of the will. The court stated that the intent of the testator was
to include the adopted child. The fact that the testator knew
the adopted child and made visits to the parents' home was
emphasized. 52 Thus, the "limitation over" provision of section 117
53
was held to be pre-empted by the testator's affirmative intent.
2. Adoption After
In the situation where the adoption occurred after the testator's
death and a gift over was involved, the decisions of the courts
are apparently in conflict. In the case of In the Matter of Will of
Charles,14 a child was adopted subsequent to the death of the testatrix. The testatrix devised property to her daughter's children or if
none survived the daughter, then to the latter's brothers or their lawful issue. The court reasoned that this implied an intention on the
part of the testatrix to include those in a filial relation with her
daughter, and this would include her adopted children. In the
recent case of In the Matter of Estate of Ward,55 the testatrix
died leaving a will under which a separate trust was created for
50 161 N.Y. 11, 55 N.E. 311 (1899).

51 In the Matter of Will of Upjohn, 304 N.Y. 366, 107 N.E.2d 492
(1952).
52 Id. at 376-77, 107 N.E.2d at 497.
53 Other cases that have adopted the same viewpoint are: In the Matter
of Estate of Jacobson, 28 Misc. 2d 1063, 213 N.Y.S.2d 458 (Surr. Ct. 1961) ;
In the Matter of Will of Bergen, 27 Misc. 2d 804, 208 N.Y.S.2d 653 (Surr.
Ct. 1960); In the Matter of Will of Camp, 6 Misc. 2d 593, 161 N.Y.S.2d
252 (Surr. Ct. 1957).
54 200 Misc. 452, 102 N.Y.S.2d 497 (Surr. Ct., aff'd memn., 279 App. Div.
741, 109 N.Y.S.2d 103 (1st Dep't 1951), aff'd mere., 304 N.Y. 776, 109 N.E.2d
76 (1952).
559 App. Div. 2d 950, 195 N.Y.S.2d 933 (2d Dep't 1959), aff'd mere.,
9 N.Y.2d 722, 174 N.E.2d 326, 214 N.Y.S.2d 340 (1961).
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each of her three children, giving them the income for life with
the remainder going to their lawful issue upon death. There
was also a provision for a "limitation over" if one of the children
died without issue. One son adopted a child after the death of
the testatrix. The court held that the evidence indicated that
the testatrix was in favor of adoption and desired to treat her
children equally; therefore, the intent of the testatrix was clearly
established.56
On the other hand, there are numerous cases which appear
to reach contrary results. In an early case,5 7 the testator created
a trust for his nephew for life with remainder to the latter's
children. The will provided that if there were no children, the
remainder would then revert and become part of the residuary
estate of the testator. After the latter's death the nephew adopted
a child. The court reasoned that the testator did not intend the
adopted child to take and thus defeat the rights of remaindermen.
58
In the case of In the Matter of Estate of Rockefellery
a trust
indenture provided that the remainder interest was to go to the
life beneficiary's children, but if he should die without children
then over to certain charities. The court held that the "limitation
over" provision prevented the adopted child from inheriting since
the grantor failed to show an intent to include the adopted child
in the inheritance. Finally, in the case of In the M11atter of Estate
of Ricks,5 9 a trust was created with income to be paid to the
grantor's son during his lifetime. Upon the latter's death the
income was made payable to the son's descendants provided that
the grantor's granddaughter was still alive. The son adopted
a child after the trust became effective. It was held that only
when the will or the surrounding facts and circumstances indicate
a contrary intention, will the word "descendant" be construed to
include adopted children.60
It is apparent from the foregoing authorities that the uncertainty of the courts in construing a will which left property to
beneficiaries such as "children," "descendants" or "lawful issue"
was a serious problem. Since the courts did not formulate concrete
6
5 Accord, In the Matter of Sands, 20 Misc. 2d 647, 190 N.Y.S.2d 584
(Sup. Ct. 1959); In the Matter of Estate of VWallerstein, 33 Mise. 2d 801,
226 N.Y.S.2d 273 (Surr. Ct. 1962), where the court held that extrinsic
evidence justified the finding that the testator intended to include adopted
children in the language "to the surviving issue of myself and my wife."
71In the Matter of Estate of Leask, 197 N.Y. 193, 90 N.E. 652
(1910).
58 15 App. Div. 2d 131, 222 N.Y.S.2d 219 (lst Dep't 1961).
59 12 App. Div. 2d 395 (1st Dep't), aff'd per curiam, 10 N.Y.2d 231, 176
N.E.2d 726, 219 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1961).
6OAccord, In the Matter of Estate of Taintor, 32 Misc. 2d 160, 222
N.Y.S.2d 882 (Surr. Ct. 1961), aff'd men., 16 App. Div. 2d 768, 228 N.Y.S.2d
461 (1st Dep't 1962).
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guidelines as to when an adopted child was included in the
above classes, it was necessary for the Legislature to take affirmative
action, and thus eliminate the many problems presented in this
area.
A Comparison With Other Jurisdictions
The recent trend in other states has been towards the inclusion of the adopted child in the class designation of "children,"
"heirs," "lawful issue" and similar language. 6- However, certain
states are still faced with the intent problem which was prevalent
in New York before the recent revision. In California, a statute
provides that adopted children have the same relation to their
62
foster parents as do natural children for purposes of succession.63
However, in the case of In the Matter of Estate of Pierce,
it was held that adopted children were not included in the
designated class of "lawful issue." In its rationale, the court
stated that the testator's intent must be derived from the language
of the will itself or from circumstances under which it was
executed. The state of Illinois appears to have adopted an approach
similar to that of California. Although the statute provides that
a lawfully adopted child is deemed a descendant of the adopting
parents for inheritance purposes,6 4 in the case of Stewart v.
Lofferty,65 it was held that an adopted child is presumed not to be
included in the class designation of "children," absent contrary
language in the will itself or in surrounding circumstances. Pennsylvania has adopted another approach. There it is provided that
in construing a will any person adopted before the testator's death
shall be considered the child of his adopting parents. 66 By
negative inference, therefore, a child adopted after the death of
the testator will not be included in the class designation of "lawful
issue," "descendant," "children" or words of similar import. Finally,
Ohio has been described by one writer as a state which, by both
legislation and liberal court interpretation, has progressed toward
the elimination of "petty legal distinctions" in the relation of
adopted children to their foster parents and relatives. 67 There,
the statute provides that the adopted child shall have the same
status and rights as the natural child for all purposes under the
61

E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §45-65 (1959); MASS.
cti. 210, §8 (1955); NJ. STAT. ANN. §9:3-30B (1960).
62 CAL. PROB. CODE § 257.
6332 Cal. 2d 265, 196 P.2d 1 (1948); See 22 So.

(1948).
64 ILL.

ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 14 (Smith-Hurd
65 12 Ill. 2d 224, 145 N.E.2d 640 (1957).
66 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.14 (1950).
6723 OHio ST. L.J. 586, 588-89 (1962).
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laws of the state.68 Although this provision does not specifically
include the situation referring to the adopted child as a member of
a class, in the case of Tiedthe v. Tiedthe,69 a will leaving the
corpus of a trust to the "heirs" of the testator upon the death
of the life tenant was construed to include the adopted child of
the latter.
Conclusion
Generally, before the revision, courts favored the adopted
child when the issue was whether the adopted child should
participate equally with the natural child. However, if the choice
was between the adopted child or a contingent remainderman,
then the cases favored the latter, indicating that the "limitation
over" provision of section 117 would apply, but this in turn
would yield to the intent of the testator. However, the problem
arose that it was extremely difficult to determine this intent. 70
The uncertainty of the law is now terminated, and the courts no
longer have to search for an intent which may or may not have
existed, since section 49 provides that unless the will specifically
provides to the contrary, the use of words such as "lawful issue,"
"children," or "descendants," shall be construed to include persons
duly adopted.
Furthermore, this amendment represents a significant step
in bestowing upon the adopted child the same status as the
natural child. One authority -has stated that it is preferable
to force those who do not desire their property to leave the blood
line to exclude the adopted child by the addition of a specific provision in a will than to deprive those who, in many cases, have
71
been closer to the deceased than the so-called next of kin.
The second major change in this area has been the repeal
of the "limitation over" subdivision of section 117. Thus, the
adopted child now inherits even in the situation where, if it were
not for the adoption, the property would have reverted to the
remainderman. Once again, this change represents a step toward
giving the adopted child the same rights as the natural child. 72
68
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REv. CODE ANN. § 3107.13 (Baldwin 1963).
157 Ohio St. 554, 106 N.E.2d 637 (1952).
This is further complicated by the restrictions imposed by the parol
evidence rule. Parol evidence as to what the testator said concerning his
intention cannot be admitted, except to explain ambiguities, since this would
defeat the statutory requirement of a written will. R cHaAWRSoN, EVIDENCE
69
70

§ 605
7 1 (8th ed. 1955); 9 WIGmoRE, EvlDnxc- § 2472 (3d ed. 1940).

Merrill, Toward Uniformity in Adoption Law, 40 IowA L. REV. 299,

319 7 2(1955).

This is expressly provided for in § 117 of the Domestic Relations Law,
but was previously subject to the "limitation over" subsection.
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The sections analyzed are two of the more significant revisions
in the estate area. However, there were also many other changes
adopted by the Legislature such as those dealing with intestate
distribution,73 the settlement of small estates without formal administration, 74 simplification of probate practice, 75 and the payment
of legal fees of an attorney-fiduciary prior to the settlement of
account. 76 One authority has called these present changes the
77
most significant legislation in the estate area since the 1930's.
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"NO-KNOCK" AND "STOP AND FRISK" PROVISIONS
NEw YORK CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

OF THE

Recently, in response to a message from Governor Rockefeller 1
urging favorable action on proposals submitted by the Combined
Council of Law Enforcement Officials, 2 the New York Legislature
enacted into law two statutes of major import concerning criminal
procedure. These acts, commonly called "No-Knock" 3 and "Stop
and Frisk," 4 have been met with both commendation and criticism
in the press. 5
The purpose of this note is to discuss the factors which
prompted the passage of such legislation, the probable effect of the
provisions upon the field of criminal procedure, and the various
constitutional issues which the acts present.
THE "No-KNOCK"

BILL

The "No-Knock" provision amends New York's Code of
Criminal Procedure by permitting a police officer, in executing
73
74
75
76

N.Y. DECED. EST. LAW § 83.
N.Y. SuuR. CT. AcT § 137.
N.Y. SURR. CT. ACT §§ 140-42, 146, 153.
N.Y. SURR. CT. ACT §231-b. For a comprehensive analysis of these

changes and many others, see SECOND RFP.
77Arenson,
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Trusts and Estates,

9 N.Y.L.F. 439 (1963).
- 1964 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 1, GOVRNOR'S MESSAGES TO THE LEGISLATURE,
Crime and Criminal Justice 14-15.
2 The Council is composed of the major law enforcement officials of the
State of New York, including, among others, the Attorney General, and the
New York State District Attorneys' Association.
3 N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRoc. § 799 (effective July 1, 1964).
4 N.Y. CODE CRIA. PROC. § 180-a (effective July 1, 1964).
5See, e.g., Time, March 20, 1964, p. 48; N.Y. Times, March 9, 1964,
p. 8, col. 1.

